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The “macro” discussion of legal education highlights that law school is 
expensive.1 This general point fails to recognize the extent to which diff erences 
exist at a “micro” level due both to geography and LSAT profi le. First, some 
regions of the country are more expensive than others.2 Second, in part to 
preserve or improve their U.S. News ranking, law schools generally award 
scholarships to applicants with higher LSAT scores, which means law school 
is not equally expensive across the entire LSAT distribution.3
This article begins in Section I by briefl y summarizing the geographic 
diff erences in tuition, which are not insignifi cant. Then, in Section II, this 
article briefl y describes a dynamic model I developed for calculating net tuition 
trends by LSAT category and describes the results of that dynamic net tuition 
model. The results demonstrate that the variability of average net tuition by 
1. Noam Scheiber, An Expensive Law Degree, and No Place to Use It, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2016, at BU1; 
David Lat, Law School Is Way Too Expensive. And Only the Federal Government Can Fix That, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/04/08/
law-school-is-way-too-expensive-and-only-the-federal-government-fix-that/?utm_
term=.2b9bf5c92d9f; Erin Fuchs, 3 Reasons Why America’s Law Schools Are Absurdly Expensive, BUS. 
INSIDER: L. & ORDER (Sept. 20, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/aba-study-
shows-why-law-school-is-expensive-2013-9 [https://perma.cc/LKM6-HFHQ].
2. See infra Section I.
3. See infra Section II; LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, LAW SCHOOL 
SCHOLARSHIP POLICIES: ENGINES OF INEQUITY 8 (2016), http://lssse.indiana.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2015/12/LSSSE-2016-Annual-Report-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZ8R-93P4] 
[hereinafter LSSSE REPORT 2016] (respondents with high LSAT scores reported receiving 
more merit scholarships compared with LSSSE respondents with modest or low LSAT 
scores).
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LSAT category increased signifi cantly between 2010 and 2014 after accounting 
for infl ation, with two LSAT categories seeing increases of 9.1% and 11.9% and 
four seeing decreases ranging from 2.8% to 13%. Section III looks at various 
outcome measures—specifi cally, bar passage rates, “bad news” employment 
outcomes, and imputed average fi rst-year income—and demonstrates that, on 
average, the short-term return on investment varies signifi cantly depending 
upon where someone is in the LSAT distribution. Section IV concludes with 
some thoughts on what this might mean for prospective law students and for 
law schools.
I.  Geographic Differences in the Cost of a Legal Education
Several years ago, in an article on the decreasing aff ordability of legal 
education, I noted some of the geographic diff erences in law school base 
tuition as of the 2010-2011 academic year.4 Those geographic diff erences have 
not changed signifi cantly in the ensuing several years.
Using the reported tuition tallies for fall 2016 from the ABA’s Standard 509 
Reports, one can see the tuition diff erences in various parts of the country.
1. With rare exception, it is very expensive to go to law school in 
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania. 
Those fi ve states had a total of sixty-two ABA-accredited law schools. 
In fall 2016, those sixty-two law schools had 13,392 fi rst-year students—
roughly 30% of all law schools and roughly 35.5% of all fi rst-year law 
students.5 Only eight of these law schools are modestly aff ordable, 
with tuition costs of roughly $14,000 to $33,000.6 These eight law 
schools have a combined enrollment of 1,091, representing only 8.1% 
of fi rst-year law students in these fi ve states.7 All other law schools in 
these fi ve states have a base tuition of at least $40,000, with twenty-
one in excess of $50,000, of which seven have tuition in excess of 
4. Jerome M. Organ, Refl ections on the Decreasing Aff ordability of Legal Education, 41 WASH. U. J. L. & 
POL’Y. 33, 53–55 (2013).
5. Total fi rst-year enrollment for these sixty-two law schools was calculated from the enrollment 
numbers provided in the enrollment summary of the law schools’ Standard 509 Information 
Reports, which can be found at SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, ABA REQUIRED DISCLOSURES, http://abarequireddisclosures.org/ (last visited 
June 7, 2017) [hereinafter ABA REQUIRED DISCLOSURES]. That spreadsheet lists 37,730 total 
fi rst-year students across all law schools.
6. The eight law schools with aff ordable tuition in these fi ve states are City University of 
New York, Northern Illinois, Southern Illinois, Temple University, University of Buff alo, 
University of LaVerne, University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth, and University of 
Pittsburgh. City University of New York is least expensive, with base tuition of $14,663, 
while University of Pittsburgh is the most expensive, with base tuition of $33,152. All the 
rest have base tuition between $20,000 and $30,000, according to the tuition data provided 
in the tuition summary of the law schools’ Standard 509 Information Reports Id.
7. Total fi rst-year enrollment for these eight law schools was calculated from the enrollment 
numbers provided in the enrollment summary of the law schools’ Standard 509 Information 
Reports. Id.
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$60,000.8 The average cost of attendance for those living off  campus 
also is higher in these fi ve states, averaging roughly $24,100 compared 
with a national average of roughly $21,500.9
2. The least expensive states in which to go to law school—those in 
which resident tuition is less than $27,000—tend to be states in which 
all law schools are public. In fourteen states, with a total of nineteen 
fully accredited  ABA law schools, resident tuition is no more than 
$27,000, and may be as little as $11,400.10 In fall 2016, these nineteen 
law schools had a total of 2,021 fi rst-year students, representing 5.4% 
of the total population of fi rst-year students in fall 2016.11 The average 
cost of attendance for those living off  campus also is much lower 
in these states, where most of the law schools are located in smaller 
communities, averaging roughly $16,500 compared with a national 
average of roughly $21,500.12
3. In a large group of states, law schools off er a wide range of base tuition 
options. For example, the eight states of Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia, and Texas had a total of 
a fi fty-seven law schools. Of those fi fty-seven law schools, eighteen 
have a base tuition of less than $25,000, twenty have a base tuition of 
$40,000 or more (of which several are more than $50,000), and the 
other nineteen have tuition somewhere in between.13 
8. Columbia University, Cornell University, Harvard University, New York University, 
University of Chicago, University of Pennsylvania, and University of Southern California 
all had tuition in excess of $60,000 for the 2016–2017 academic year, according to the tuition 
data provided in the tuition summary of the law schools’ Standard 509 Information Reports. 
Id.
9. Average cost of attendance for law schools in these fi ve states and for law schools nationally 
was calculated from the cost data provided in the tuition summary of the law schools’ 
Standard 509 Information Reports. Id.
10. The fourteen states are Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah (BYU is not a public university 
but does have a very low base tuition), West Virginia, and Wyoming. The least expensive 
resident tuition in these fourteen states can be found at Montana and North Dakota, at 
roughly $11,400, while the most expensive tuition in these fourteen states can be found at 
UNLV, at roughly $26,700, according to the tuition data provided in the tuition summary of 
the law schools’ Standard 509 Information Reports. Id.
11. Total fi rst-year enrollment for these nineteen law schools was calculated from the enrollment 
numbers provided in the enrollment summary of the law schools’ Standard 509 Information 
Reports. Id.
12. Average cost of attendance for law schools in these fourteen states and for law schools 
nationally was calculated from the cost data provided in the tuition summary of the law 
schools’ Standard 509 Information Reports. Id.
13. This summary of tuition in these states is drawn from the tuition data provided in the tuition 
summary of the law schools’ Standard 509 Information Reports. Id.
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4. The range of cost options is narrower in a smaller group of states—
generally in the $30,000-$45,000 range. For example, in Oregon and 
Washington, the range of options is from roughly $32,500 to roughly 
$43,600.14
The simple point of this analysis is that geographic variations continue to 
exist regarding base tuition and other costs of attendance. These geographical 
diff erences should not be ignored when one thinks about the expense of legal 
education.15 In several states legal education is very expensive for almost 
everyone considering law school, but in several states legal education is 
relatively inexpensive, and several others have a wide range of tuition options.
II.  Differences in Average Net Tuition Based on LSAT Category
Base tuition prices, however, do not tell the whole story. Increasingly, a 
growing number of students are not paying “sticker price” for law school.16 
Thus, when one takes into account the scholarships distributed to students, 
variability of net tuition becomes even more manifest.
A.  The Process and Model
Over the past eighteen months, I have developed a dynamic model for 
estimating the net tuition for all entering law students at all fully accredited 
ABA law schools outside Puerto Rico for the period 2010–2014, broken down 
into six LSAT categories and six net tuition categories.
This process began in early 2013 when I looked at the Class of 2011 and 
developed a very simple two-by-three grid featuring two LSAT categories and 
three net tuition categories for comments I submitted in February 2013 at a 
hearing of the ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education.17
14. There are six law schools in Oregon and Washington, with the two public law schools, 
University of Oregon and University of Washington, having resident tuition of $32,500, 
while the four private law schools have tuition ranging from roughly $37,200 for Gonzaga 
University to roughly $43,600 for Seattle University. Id.
15. In 2016, the average cost of attendance across major metropolitan areas with law schools 
varied from more than $27,000 in Miami and Los Angeles to less than $18,000 in Pittsburgh 
and the Twin Cities. Id.
16. See Derek T. Muller, The Percentage of Law School Enrollees Receiving Scholarships Continues to Climb, 
EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY (Mar. 27, 2017), http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2017/3/the-
percentage-of-law-school-enrollees-receiving-scholarships-continues-to-climb [https://
perma.cc/JC5A-DH88] (showing that the percentage of law students on scholarship grew 
from roughly 50% in 2011 to roughly 67% in 2015) [hereinafter Muller, Percentage of Scholarships 
Climbing]; see infra Table 1 and accompanying text (showing diff erential increases in percentage 
of students on scholarship between 2010 and 2014 based on median LSAT of law school).
17. The simple grid looked at those with LSATs of 156 and above and those with LSATs of 
155 and below and broke net tuition into three categories—less than $20,000, $20,000 to 
$30,000 and $30,000 or more. That model showed that a higher percentage of those with 
LSATs of 156 or more were paying less than $20,000 while a higher percentage of those with 
LSATs of 155 or less were paying $30,000 or more. See Comments of Professor Jerome M. 
Organ, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, to the Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force on the Future of 
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Then, in 2014, I expanded the analysis to a fi ve-by-fi ve grid—fi ve LSAT 
categories and fi ve net tuition categories—as applied to the Class of 2012, 
which I presented at the AALS Conference in Washington, D.C., in January 
2015, and subsequently posted on The Legal Whiteboard.18
Aware of the changes taking place in the number of applicants and the 
profi le of the applicant pool,19 it struck me that it would be interesting to assess 
what was happening over time regarding net tuition by LSAT category. With 
that in mind, I requested grant support from AccessLex Institute20 to analyze 
two questions. First, I wanted to fi nd out the extent to which the average net 
tuition diff ered signifi cantly by LSAT category over time between 2010 and 
2014. Second, I wanted to fi nd out the extent to which graduates of law schools 
with median LSATs at diff erent points along the LSAT distribution also can 
anticipate signifi cant variability in outcomes such as bar passage, “bad news” 
employment outcomes, and average imputed fi rst-year income.  
Because base tuition had increased above $50,000 at several schools 
between 2012 and 2014,21 and because more schools were welcoming students 
with LSATs below 145 by 2014,22 the model I proposed was now a six-by-six 
Legal Educ. (Feb. 9, 2013) at 4–6 [https://perma.cc/RVM8-DTSZ]. (I am very grateful for 
the help of my brother, Jim Organ, in developing the spreadsheet for that initial analysis.)
18. See Jerry Organ, The Variable Aff ordability of Law School—How Geography and LSAT Profi le Impact 
Tuition Costs, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Jan. 6, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
legalwhiteboard/2015/01/the-variable-aff ordability-of-law-school-how-geography-and-lsat-
profi le-impact-tuition-costs.html [https://perma.cc/45UB-AX6Q]. A more complete set 
of PowerPoint slides from my presentation at AALS also is available on SSRN. https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2545583. The fi ve LSAT categories were 165+, 
160–164, 155–159, 150–154, and less than 150. The fi ve net tuition categories were $0-$10,000, 
$10,001-$20,000, $20,001-$30,000, $30,001-$40,000, and $40,001 or more.
19. Jerry Organ, Understanding Trends in Demographics of Law Students—Part One, LEGAL WHITEBOARD 
(Oct. 11, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2013/10/understanding-
trends-in-demographics-of-law-students-part-one.html [https://perma.cc/CZB4-RMT9]; 
Jerry Organ, Understanding Trends in Demographics of Law Students—Part Two, LEGAL WHITEBOARD 
(Oct. 17, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2013/10/understanding-
trends-in-demographics-of-law-students-part-two.html [https://perma.cc/MN4R-67NA]; 
Jerry Organ, Understanding Trends in Demographics of Law Students—Part Three, LEGAL WHITEBOARD 
(Nov. 24, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2013/11/understanding-
trends-in-demographics-of-law-students-part-three.html [https://perma.cc/R35X-XZWU]; 
Jerry Organ, The Composition of Graduating Classes of Law Students—2013-2016—Part One, LEGAL 
WHITEBOARD (Dec. 29, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2014/12/
the-composition-of-graduating-classes-of-law-students-2013-2016-part-one-.html [https://
perma.cc/9HC2-KXRS] [hereinafter Organ, The Composition of Graduating Classes].
20. AccessLex Institute was known as Access Group before Mar. 1, 2017.
21. As of 2014, twenty-four law schools had tuition in excess of $50,000. See ABA REQUIRED 
DISCLOSURES, supra note 5 with specifi c reference to the tuition data for 2014.
22. Organ, The Composition of Graduating Classes, supra note 19 (showing increase in number of law 
schools with median LSATs of less than 145).
Net Tuition Trends by LSAT Category
56 Journal of Legal Education
grid, with an additional net tuition category (more than $50,000) and an 
additional LSAT category (less than 145). 
Notably, this dynamic net tuition model is very complicated precisely because 
it is dynamic. The earlier models were static models. Law schools report grants 
and scholarships on the entire student body. In the “static” models, I assumed 
fi rst-year scholarships represented one-third of the scholarships within the 
entire student body. But in estimating net tuition trends over time, the static 
model will understate changes over time. That is particularly true in a market 
in which the number of law school applicants is declining23 and many law 
schools are increasing the number and amount of scholarships for fi rst-year 
students, given increased competition for a declining pool of candidates.24 
Accordingly, I had to develop a dynamic model individualized for each law 
school to respond to what that each law school appeared to be doing over time 
in terms of changes in scholarship assistance. A detailed description of this 
model is set forth in the appendix.
Using this dynamic model, I generated net tuition calculations for all fi rst-
year students at each of the law schools fully accredited by the ABA during the 
period from 2010-2014. I then allocated students into cells on a six-by-six grid, 
featuring the six LSAT categories: 165 or higher, 160–164, 155–159, 150–154, 
145–149, and less than 145, along with six “net tuition categories”—$0–$10,000, 
$10,001–$20,000, $20,001–$30,000, $30,001–$40,000, $40,001–$50,000, and 
$50,001 and up.
For each LSAT category in each year, I then calculated an average net 
tuition by adding up the total net tuition paid by all students in a given LSAT 
category and dividing by the number of students in that LSAT category.
B.  Average Net Tuition Trends by LSAT Category between 2010 and 2014
Figure 1 summarizes the percentage change in average net tuition by LSAT 
category between 2010 and 2014.25
Figure 1— Percentage Change in Average Net Tuition 2010–2014
by LSAT Category (in 2014 dollars)
23. See supra note 19.
24. See supra note 16.
25. Table 1 in the appendix contains the data used in generating Figures 1, 2, and 3.
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Between 2010 and 2014, students in two LSAT categories saw average 
net tuition increase (165 or higher, up 9.1%; less than 145, up 11.9%), after 
accounting for infl ation.26 Students in the other four LSAT categories saw 
average net tuition decrease during the same period (150–154 down 13%; 155–159 
down 11.9%; 160–164 down 5%; and, 145–149 down 2.8%).
Figure 2 shows the change in average net tuition between 2010 and 2014 
across diff erent LSAT categories in 2014 dollars.
Figure 2—Comparison of Average Net Tuition by LSAT Category between 
2010 and 2014 (in 2014 dollars)
In 2010, the range of average net tuition (in 2014 dollars) went from $24,272 
for those in the 160–164 category to over $30,000, for those in three LSAT 
categories, which saw average net tuition between $30,000 and $31,000. The 
145–149 category had an average net tuition of $30,945, the 150–154 category 
had an average net tuition of $30,219, and the 165 or higher category had an 
average net tuition of $30,044. Thus, the spread between the most expensive 
category (145–149) and the least expensive category (160–164) in 2010 was 
roughly $6,700 in 2014 dollars. This means those in the most expensive 
category had an average net tuition roughly 28% more than those in the least 
expensive category. The two least expensive categories overall in 2010 were 
160–164 (average net tuition of $24,272) and 155–159 (average net tuition of 
$26,977) (in 2014 dollars).
Because of the diff erent percentage changes shown in Figure 1, the range 
of average net tuition grew signifi cantly by 2014, from $23,004 at the low end 
(for those in the 160-164 category) to $32,912 at the high end (for those in the 
less-than-145 category). Thus, the spread between the most expensive category 
(less than 145) and the least expensive category (160–164) grew to roughly 
$9,900. By 2014, the average net tuition for those in both the 165-or-higher 
category and the less-than-145 category was over $32,000, while the average net 
26. In accounting for infl ation, I used the US INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.
usinfl ationcalculator.com/, which showed infl ation of 8.6% from 2010–2014, 5.2% from 
2011–2014, 3.1% from 2012–2014, and 1.6% from 2013–2014.
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tuition for those in the 155–159 and 160–164 categories was less than $24,000. 
This means those in the two most expensive categories in 2014 had an average 
net tuition of roughly 38% to 43% more than those in the two least expensive 
categories. The two least expensive categories overall remained 155–159 and 
160–164, with those in the 160–164 category paying roughly $600 less than 
those in the 155–159 category (down from roughly $2700 less in 2010).
Figure 3—Change in Average Rank of Law School Attended
Between 2010 and 2014
by LSAT Category
This pattern of changes over time also is refl ected in the chart in Figure 3. 
The chart delineates the average net ranking of law school attended by those 
students in each LSAT category in 2010 and in 2014.27 The LSAT categories 
showing the greatest numerical improvement in average net ranking were the 
two middle categories—155–159 (average net ranking improved by 22 from 105 to 
83) and 150–154 (average net ranking improved by 21 from 136 to 115). The next 
best improvement was in the 160–164 category (average net ranking improved 
by 19, from 71 to 52). By contrast, the 165-or-higher category and the 145–149 
category saw only modest improvement in ranking (average net ranking 
improved by 10 for both categories (from 25 to 15 for 165 or higher and from 
152 to 142 for 145–149)). The less-than-145 category saw the least improvement 
in average net ranking of law school attended (average net ranking improved 
by 6, from 170 to 164). Thus, the two middle LSAT categories, which saw 
the largest decreases in average net tuition between 2010 and 2014, also saw 
the greatest improvement in average net ranking of law school attended. The 
students in these categories paid less in average net tuition in 2014 than in 2010 
to attend a law school with a much better average net ranking.
One other thing worth noting regarding net tuition and average net ranking 
is that even though those in the 165-or-higher category are paying an average 
net tuition nearly as great as those in the less-than-145 category as of 2014, they 
27. In calculating the average rank, I assigned all “alphabetically ranked” schools a ranking of 
170—roughly the midpoint between the average ranking of the last numerically-ranked law 
school in the years 2010–2014 and the total number of law schools in the model.
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are not buying the same legal education. Those in the 165-or-higher category 
were attending law schools with an average rank of 25 in 2010 and an average 
rank of 15 in 2014. By contrast, although they were paying slightly more in 
terms of average net tuition as of 2014, those in the less-than-145 category were 
attending law schools with an average rank of 170 in 2010 and an average rank 
of 164 in 2014. The diff erent short-term returns on investment associated with 
these categories of law schools will be discussed in Section III.
Another way of looking at these data is to focus on the percentage of 
students in each LSAT category who have a net tuition that is very modest 
(less than $20,000) or very expensive (more than $40,000). Figure 4 shows, 
for each of the six LSAT categories, the percentage of fi rst-year students in 
2014 whose net tuition in the dynamic model was less than $20,000 or more 
than $40,000. 
Figure 4—Percentage of Students in 2014 by LSAT Category with
Average Net Tuition Less than $20,000 or More than $40,000
Figure 4 demonstrates that for the LSAT categories of 160–164, 155–159, 
and 150–154, a much larger percentage of fi rst-year students in 2014 had a net 
tuition of less than $20,000 compared with those with a net tuition of $40,000 
or more. By contrast, in the LSAT categories of 165 or higher and less than 
145, a much higher percentage of fi rst-year students in 2014 had a net tuition of 
$40,000 or higher compared with those with a net tuition of $20,000 or less. 
The only LSAT category in which the percentages were roughly the same was 
the 145–149 category, with 19% with net tuition less than $20,000 and 17% with 
net tuition more than $40,000.
C.  What Do These Differences in Average Net Tuition Mean?
What explains this diff erential change in average net tuition by LSAT 
category? Why did those at the high end of the LSAT distribution (165 or 
higher) and those at the low end of the LSAT distribution (less than 145) both 
end up seeing signifi cant increases in the average net tuition and only modest 
increases in average rank of law school between 2010 and 2014, while those 
Net Tuition Trends by LSAT Category
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in the middle (150–154 and 155–159) actually saw average net tuition decrease 
by over 10% and saw greater numerical improvement in average rank of law 
school?
One simple explanation is that even with the change in the applicant pool, 
law schools at the top of the LSAT distribution and the bottom of the LSAT 
distribution still had “pricing power,” while those in the middle of the LSAT 
distribution did not. We can see this by looking at each of the LSAT categories 
separately.28
i.  Law Schools at the High and Low Ends of the LSAT Distribution
Still Have Pricing Power
Those law schools with median LSATs of 165 or higher are recognized 
as being prestigious law schools. In 2010, thirty law schools had a median 
LSAT of 165 or more. In 2014, twenty-one law schools had a median LSAT 
of 165.29 These are law schools with signifi cant brand value—with Harvard, 
Yale, Stanford, and Columbia at the top of the list, and Texas, Vanderbilt, 
Emory, and George Washington at the bottom of the list. Even with the 
overall decline in applicants from roughly 87,900 in 2010 to roughly 55,700 
in 2014,30 these law schools still received applications ranging from more 
than 3,500 prospective law students (Emory) up to roughly 6,000 prospective 
law students (Harvard).31 At these law schools, prestige and brand are seen 
as providing a reasonable value proposition among those applicants to law 
school at the high end of the LSAT distribution, even with tuition costs that 
exceeded $50,000 in several cases as of 2014.32
28. This is consistent with the analysis of the legal education market presented by Dr. Robert 
Zemsky at the Access Group Symposium in Chicago in November 2016. See Presentation 
of Robert Zemsky at Access Group Symposium, November 2016, https://www.accesslex.
org/sites/default/files/2017-06/Symposium%20Powerpoint%20-%20Zemsky_ALI.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9ZDL-R44L].
29. Jerry Organ, Changes in Composition of the LSAT Profi les of Matriculants and Law Schools Between 
2010 and 2015, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Jan. 18, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
legalwhiteboard/2016/01/in-late-december-2014-i-posted-a-blog-analyzing-how-the-
distribution-of-matriculants-across-lsat-categories-had-changed-si.html [https://perma.
cc/8D6R-L8MX]. This decline is directly related to the signifi cant decline in the number of 
matriculants with LSATs of 165 or higher.
30. Archive: ABA End-of-Year Summary—Applicants, Admitted Applicants & Applications, LAW SCH. 
ADMISSION COUNCIL, https://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/aba-eoy/archive [https://
perma.cc/LPX7-B9VC] (reporting data for fall 2008 through fall 2015).
31. See 2014 Standard 509 Information Reports for Emory and Harvard. ABA REQUIRED 
DISCLOSURES, supra note 5. Yale actually had the fewest applications in 2014 among this 
group of schools, with roughly 2,800 applications, but that is largely because a number of 
applicants realize there is not much point in applying to Yale given that it only admitted 255 
applicants to yield a class of 200 in 2014. 2014 Standard 509 Information Report for Yale, 
ABA REQUIRED DISCLOSURES, supra note 5.
32. See supra note 8.
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Nonetheless, with a signifi cant decline in the number of applicants to law 
school with LSATs of 165 or higher between 2010 and 2014, those matriculants 
in the 165-or-higher category in 2014 actually found themselves on average 
going to law schools ranked even higher than in 2010. This is a diff erent 
manifestation of the same “prestige” theme. In 2010, there were nearly 9,500 
matriculants with LSAT scores of 165 or higher distributed well beyond the top 
twenty-fi ve law schools.33 In 2014, that number had declined to roughly 6,200.34 
That smaller number of applicants/matriculants with LSAT scores of 165 or 
higher tended to occupy seats available in the most prestigious law schools (an 
average ranking of 15 in 2014 compared with an average ranking of 25 in 2010). 
A signifi cant percentage of this smaller population of applicants/matriculants 
with LSAT scores of 165 or higher had opportunities to have lower net tuitions 
by accepting scholarships to law schools ranked slightly lower. Nonetheless, 
on average, these students opted for highly ranked, prestigious law schools 
that continued to increase tuition, resulting in a relatively signifi cant increase 
in the average net tuition between 2010 and 2014 for students in the 165-or-
higher category.35 
By contrast, while those law schools with median LSAT scores at the bottom 
of the LSAT distribution do not off er the prestige or brand value of a Harvard 
or Stanford or Texas or George Washington, they do off er an opportunity 
to obtain a law degree for a not insignifi cant population of applicants for 
whom the law degree continues to be perceived as holding value/promise. 
Indeed, while the population of applicants with LSAT scores of 165 or higher 
declined by roughly 37% between 2010 and 2014, the population of applicants 
with LSAT scores of less than 145 declined by only 21%.36 More signifi cantly, 
however, the admit rate for this population of applicants with LSAT scores 
33. Organ, Composition of Graduating Classes, supra note 19.
34. Id.
35. As further evidence of this point, an analysis focused solely on those students receiving 
full scholarships in the net tuition model shows 2,415 in 2010, of which 43% were students 
in the 165-or-higher LSAT category (1038); by 2014, however, 2,638 students received full 
scholarships, of whom only 25% (650) were in the 165-or-higher LSAT category.  When there 
were 9,500 matriculants in 2010, there were far more matriculants than there were spots in 
the top-15 law schools, so many of those matriculants who may not have been admitted 
to top-15 law schools “chose” full scholarships at schools of slightly lower rank.  By 2014, 
however, with only 6,200 matriculants at 165 or higher, far fewer were not being admitted to 
top-15 law schools.  With a choice between a top-15 law school (without a full scholarship) 
or a top-50 law school (with a full scholarship), many students in the 165-or-higher category 
appear to have opted for the top-15 option. Spreadsheet with calculations on fi le with author. 
  Notably, this is consistent with the analysis Deborah Merritt and Andrew Merritt 
highlight in their companion piece in this issue regarding the decisions of high school 
students from wealthy families who are willing to pay full tuition to attend a more elite 
college or university. Deborah Jones Merritt & Andrew Lloyd Merritt, Agreements to Improve 
Student Aid: An Antitrust Perspective, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 17, 39–40 nn.139–145 and accompanying 
text (citing several sources addressing these issues in decisions by college-bound students).
36. Calculations generated by the author using LSAC’s National Decision Profi les for 2010 and 
for 2014.
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of less than 145 increased from roughly 17.5% in 2010 to more than 40% by 
2014.37 Thus, for those on the low end of the LSAT distribution, the declining 
applicant pool and the changing demographics of the applicant pool meant 
more opportunities to go to law school, but only at a limited number of lower-
ranked law schools. With few options available to them, the law students at 
the low end of the LSAT distribution have not had much bargaining power 
over price, while the law schools they are choosing to attend continue to hold 
some pricing power in this submarket of the law school market.
Indeed, at one level, the law school “market” really consists of several 
regional markets or “micro-markets” based on the LSAT score of applicants. 
While applicants with high LSAT scores could choose to go anywhere for a 
net tuition of zero or close to zero, the brand/prestige allure of top-ranked law 
schools functions as a discrete “national” micro-market for the vast majority of 
prospective law students with high LSAT scores. Top-ranked law schools have 
continued to attract these students, who are willing to pay a signifi cant price 
for a diploma from one of these elite law schools rather than go to a somewhat 
lower-ranked law school at a lower net tuition.
By contrast, at the low end of the LSAT distribution there is a separate 
micro-market for applicants with low LSAT scores who have no other options 
available to them. Desirous of the prospect for social mobility that comes 
with a law degree, these students are willing to pay a pretty penny for the 
opportunity to earn a law degree from a law school that has little prestige or 
brand value but provides the only doorway through which these low-LSAT 
students can possibly gain access to the legal profession.
ii.  Law Schools in the Middle Lack Pricing Power
What is happening in the middle? With the signifi cant decline in applicants 
with LSAT scores of 165 or higher and 160-164, more elite law schools are looking 
to fi ll their classes with students with less robust LSAT profi les (refl ected in the 
decline in the number of law schools with median LSATs of 165 or higher, for 
example). This is demonstrated by the fact that the average rank of law school 
has improved by roughly 20 places between 2010 and 2014 for law students 
in the 150–154, 155–159, and 160–164 LSAT categories. As a result, law schools 
seeking to attract applicants with LSATs between 150 and 154 and between 155 
and 159 are fi nding themselves squeezed. They are no longer just competing 
regionally, or among those law schools within a similar LSAT range—they are 
now competing up the rankings against elite law schools with greater brand/
prestige values. The decreasing population of applicants in the 150–154 and 
155–159 ranges, combined with the greater competition for these students with 
law schools higher in the rankings, has meant that law schools in the middle 
have lost pricing power. Thus, the average net tuition for law students in the 
150–154 range and the 155–159 range declined by more than 10% between 2010 
37. Id.
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and 2014 as more law schools off ered more of these students larger scholarships 
that more than counterbalanced increases in tuition during this period.38
This analysis is corroborated by a diff erent analysis of some of the data in 
the ABA Standard 509 reports for 2010 and 2014. Table 1 contains data on the 
number of students in law schools with median LSATs in fi ve LSAT categories 
in 2010 and 2014, along with data on the weighted-average percentage of 
students on scholarship at those law schools in 2010 and 2014.39
Table 1—Changes in First-Year Enrollment and Percentage of Students on 
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<150 4215 7031 66.8% 55% 67% 21.8%
150-154 11605 9034 -22.2% 48% 76% 58.3%
155-159 13643 9563 -29.9% 56% 77% 37.5%
160-164 11858 4989 -57.9% 64% 82% 28.1%
165+ 9009 6380 -29.2% 59% 68% 15.3%
Table 1 shows how the distribution of students and the percentage on 
scholarship changed between 2010 and 2014 across law schools with median 
LSATs in diff erent LSAT categories.40 The biggest decline in fi rst-year student 
population between 2010 and 2014 occurred in the category of law schools with 
median LSATs of 160–164, which saw a decline of nearly 58%, largely because 
the number of law schools with median LSATs of 160–164 fell from 47 to 29. 
Meanwhile, the only increase in fi rst-year student population between 2010 
and 2014 occurred in the category of law schools with median LSATs of less 
than 150, which saw an increase of nearly 67%, largely because the number of 
law schools with median LSATs of less than 150 increased from nine to thirty-
six.41 At the same time, however, law schools with median LSATs of 150–154 
saw the largest increase in the percentage of students on scholarship (58.3%), 
while law schools with median LSATs of 155–159 saw the second largest increase 
(37.5%). Meanwhile, the two categories that saw the smallest increases in in the 
38. As further evidence of this reality, the data on full scholarships from the dynamic net tuition 
model are once again instructive. In 2010, only 12% of those with full scholarships were in 
the 150–154 category (seventeen) or in the 155–159 category (287). In 2014, however, 38% of 
those receiving full scholarships were in these two categories, with 195 in the 150–154 category 
and 815 in the 155–159 category. Spreadsheet with calculations on fi le with author.
39. Spreadsheet with calculations on fi le with author.
40. These data are compiled from the ABA Standard 509 Report spreadsheets. ABA REQUIRED 
DISCLOSURES, supra note 5. The spreadsheet with the compiled data is on fi le with the author.
41. There were no law schools with a median LSAT of less than 145 in 2010, so for purposes of 
Table 1, only fi ve LSAT categories are listed. See Organ, The Composition of Graduating Classes, 
supra note 19.
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percentage of students with scholarships were law schools with medians less 
than 150 (only 21.8%) and law schools with medians of 165 or higher (only 
15.3%). Thus, this similarly shows less pricing power among law schools with 
median LSATs in the 150–154 and 155–159 categories, and more pricing power 
among law schools with median LSATs of less than 150 and of 165 or higher.
The data compiled through the dynamic net tuition model also demonstrate 
this shift toward having far fewer students paying full tuition. For fi rst-year 
students in 2010, 43.4% were paying full tuition, of whom 52% were in the 
150–154 and the 155–159 LSAT categories, and 27% were in the 145–149 and 
less-than-145 categories. By 2014, only 26.2% were paying full tuition, of whom 
34% were in the 150–154 and 155–159 LSAT categories, and 48% were in the 
145–149 and less-than-145 categories.42 Thus, not only were far fewer fi rst-year 
students paying full tuition in 2014, but a much larger percentage of those 
paying full tuition were in the two lowest LSAT categories.
For those interested in looking more closely at year-over-year changes in 
each net tuition category for each LSAT category, along with changes in the 
average ranking of law school for each net tuition category for each LSAT 
category between 2010 and 2014, separate tables are set forth in the appendix 
for each of the six LSAT categories.
III.  Short-Term Return on Investment—What Can We Learn from
Looking at Different Outcome Measures for Categories of
Law Schools Based on Median LSAT?
This analysis of outcome measures that speak to “short-term” return on 
investment focuses on three separate measures: bar passage; “bad news” 
employment outcomes; and, imputed average income for graduates. The 
charts look at results for 2013 and 2015, the graduating years that correspond 
with the fi rst and third of the entering classes in the dynamic net tuition model, 
the entering classes of 2010 and 2012.43
In generating these data, I grouped law schools by median LSAT of the 
entering class in 2010 and 2012. The analysis is based on fi ve categories of 
law schools, those with a median LSAT of 165 or higher, those with a median 
LSAT of 160–164, those with a median LSAT of 155–159, those with a median 
LSAT of 150–154, and those with a median LSAT of less than 150.44
These outcomes measures show that the short-term return on investment 
is substantially diff erent for graduates of law schools with median LSATs less 
than 150 than for graduates of law schools with median LSATs of 165 or higher. 
42. The spreadsheet with the compiled data is on fi le with the author.
43. The Class of 2015 is the most recent class for which both bar passage data and employment 
outcomes data are available. The December 2016 Standard 509 Information Reports contain 
bar passage outcomes for the 2015 calendar year. The April 2016 Employment Summary 
Reports contain employment outcomes for the Class of 2015.
44. The number of law schools with median LSATs of less than 145 for the three years from 2010 
to 2012 was not suffi  cient enough to create a separate category.
65
Even though graduates of law schools with a median LSAT of less than 150 
have an average net tuition nearly the same as graduates of law schools with a 
median LSAT of 165 or higher, graduates of law schools with a median LSAT 
of less than 150: 
1) perform roughly 34% worse on bar passage than graduates of law 
schools with a median LSAT of 165 or higher; 
2) are fi ve times more likely to have “bad news” employment outcomes 
compared with graduates of law schools with a median LSAT of 165 
or higher; and 
3) have an average fi rst-year imputed income that is less than half of the 
average fi rst-year imputed income of graduates of law schools with a 
median LSAT of 165 or higher.
A.  Bar Passage Outcomes
The bar passage outcomes set forth in Figure 5 are based on weighted 
averages generated by allocating all law schools into one of fi ve LSAT 
categories as described above. Using the ABA’s Standard 509 Information 
Report spreadsheet for bar passage, I multiplied the composite bar passage 
rate for each law school for each year by the number of fi rst-time takers listed 
for each law school for that year. Those “products” were then summed across 
all law schools within a given LSAT category. That sum was then divided 
by the total number of fi rst-time takers for all law schools within that LSAT 
category. The result is the weighted-average fi rst-time bar passage rate for that 
LSAT category.45
Figure 5—Weighted-Average First-Time Bar Passage Rates for Graduates 
for Categories of Law Schools Based on Median LSAT in 2010 and 2012
Figure 5 highlights that fi rst-time bar passage outcomes decline signifi cantly 
in correspondence with declines in the median LSAT category for law schools. 
For the class that entered in 2010 and graduated in 2013, law schools with a 
45. The spreadsheets with the bar passage calculations for Figure 5 are on fi le with the author.
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median LSAT of 165 or higher had a weighted-average fi rst-time bar passage 
rate of 92.4%, while law schools with a median LSAT of less than 150 had a 
signifi cantly lower weighted-average fi rst-time bar passage rate of 60.6%.46 As 
one goes “down” the categories of law schools by median LSAT one sees a 
direct relationship between declines in median LSAT category and declines 
in weighted-average fi rst-time bar passage rates. Law schools with a median 
LSAT of 160–164 had a weighted-average fi rst-time bar passage rate in 2013 of 
85.9%; those with a median LSAT of 155–159 had a weighted-average fi rst-time 
bar passage rate of 83.1%; and those with a median LSAT of 150–154 had a 
weighted-average fi rst-time bar passage rate of 76.9%.
For the class that entered in 2012 and graduated in 2015, this relationship 
across categories remained consistent, but all fi ve categories of law schools saw 
declines in weighted-average fi rst-time bar passage rate, with the most notable 
decline—a nine-point decline—for those law schools in the 150–154 category. 
All other categories generally saw declines of 3.4% (165 and higher) to 5.3% 
(155–159).47
B.  “Bad News” Employment Outcomes
The “bad news” employment outcomes set forth in Figure 6 are based on 
weighted averages generated by allocating all law schools into one of fi ve 
LSAT categories as described above. I used the ABA’s Employment Outcome 
46. For students with LSATs of less than 145, even this weighted-average bar passage rate of 
60.6% in 2013 and 56.2% in 2015 might overstate their likelihood of success on the bar exam 
for two reasons. First, the attrition rate among law schools with median LSATs of less than 150 
averaged roughly 14% between 2010-11 and 2014-15. See Jerry Organ, Updated Analysis of Attrition 
Through the 2014-15 Academic Year, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Feb. 27, 2016), http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2016/02/updated-analysis-of-attrition-through-the-2014-15-
academic-year.html [https://perma.cc/8N5J-Q74Z]. Second, the bar passage rate for a given 
law school refl ects an average among graduates who perform at diff erent rates on the bar 
exam depending upon their grades in law school. The LSAC correlation studies, see, e.g., 
Lisa C. Anthony, et al., Predictive Validity of the LSAT: A National Summary of the 2013 and 
2014 LSAT Correlation Studies, Law School Admission Council LSAT Technical Report 
16-01 (March 2016), https://www.lsac.org/docs/default-source/research-(lsac-resources)/tr-
16-01.pdf, suggest that those at the top of the entering class profi le on average can expect to 
perform better in the fi rst-year of law school.  Other studies have shown a correlation between 
law school grades and bar passage. See, e.g., Scott Johns, Empirical Refl ections: A Statistical Analysis 
of Bar Exam Program Interventions, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 35 (2016) (highlighting that 
strongest predictor of bar exam performance was law school grades followed by LSAT 
score). Thus, those in the bottom of the entering class profi le at a given law school on 
average can expect to perform worse in law school than those in the top half of the entering 
class profi le at that law school, and correspondingly, can expect to perform worse than the 
reported bar passage rate for that law school.
47. These declines are consistent with overall results reported by the National Conference 
of Bar Examiners (NCBE). The NCBE reported an average fi rst-time bar passage rate 
for graduates of ABA-accredited law schools of 82% for the July 2013 bar exam, but an 
average fi rst-time bar passage rate for graduates of ABA-accredited law schools of 75% for 
the July 2015 bar exam. See 2013 Statistics, NAT’L CONF. BAR EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.
org/dmsdocument/144; 2015 Statistics, NAT’L CONF. BAR EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/
dmsdocument/195.
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Summary spreadsheet for the Class of 2013 and the Class of 2015 to identify the 
number of graduates in the following three categories—unemployed seeking, 
unemployed not seeking, and employment status unknown—and added the 
numbers together to get a total for each law school.48 For each category of law 
school, then, the “bad news” tallies for all law schools in that category were 
summed. Then graduates for all law schools in that category were summed. 
Then the sum of all “bad news” employment outcomes was divided by the 
sum of all graduates to get the weighted-average percentage “bad news” 
employment outcomes in each law school category. Figure 6 contains the 
results for the class that entered law school in 2010 and graduated in 2013 and 
the class that entered law school in 2012 and graduated in 2015.49
Figure 6—Weighted-Average “Bad News” Employment Outcomes for 
Graduates for Categories of Law Schools Based on Median LSAT
in 2010 and 2012
Figure 6 highlights that the weighted average of “bad news” employment 
outcomes increases signifi cantly with declines in the median LSAT category 
for law schools. For law schools with a median LSAT of 165 or higher, only 
5.7% of 2013 graduates had “bad news” employment outcomes, while law 
schools with a median LSAT of less than 150 had 31.2% of graduates with “bad 
news” employment outcomes. 
As one goes “down” the LSAT categories of law schools one fi nds an inverse 
relationship with declines in median LSAT category refl ecting an increase in 
weighted-average “bad news” employment outcomes. Law schools with a 
median LSAT of 160–164 had a weighted-average “bad news” employment 
48. See http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/. The 2014 link under Compilation—
All Schools Data contains employment outcomes for the Class of 2013. The 2016 link 
contains employment outcomes for the Class of 2015. I included “unemployed not seeking” 
within the “bad news” category because for the years reported there was not great clarity 
about when a graduate should be listed as “unemployed not seeking.” This is manifested 
partly in a signifi cant decline in the “unemployed not seeking” category between the Class 
of 2013 and the Class of 2015 (from 755 to 502), a decline of 33.5%.
49. The spreadsheets with the “bad news” employment outcomes calculations for Figure 6 are 
on fi le with the author.
Net Tuition Trends by LSAT Category
68 Journal of Legal Education
outcome for the class of 2013 of 13.2%, law schools with a median LSAT of 
155–159 had a weighted-average “bad news” employment outcome of 15.4%, 
and law schools with a median LSAT of 150–154 had a weighted-average “bad 
news” employment outcome of 20%.
For the class that entered in 2012 and graduated in 2015, this relationship 
across categories remained consistent. Interestingly, however, even though bar 
passage rates fell between 2013 and 2015, graduates of all fi ve categories of 
law school saw improvements in employment outcomes, in that the weighted-
average “bad news” employment outcome declined in all fi ve law school LSAT 
categories between 2013 and 2015. This partly refl ects a modestly improved 
employment market for law school graduates between 2013 and 2015.50 To 
some extent, however, it also may refl ect improved tracking of graduates by law 
schools between 2013 and 2015 as the number of graduates in the “employment 
unknown” category dropped more signifi cantly between 2013 and 2015 than 
the number of graduates in the “unemployed seeking” category.51
C.  Imputed Average Income for Graduates
The imputed average incomes for graduates reported in Figure 7 are based 
on weighted averages generated by allocating to all graduates of law schools 
in each of the fi ve LSAT categories an “income.” Once again, these data are 
generated, in the fi rst instance, by using data reported in the ABA Employment 
Summary Report spreadsheet, which include delineations of the number 
of graduates in a variety of job categories.52 For the vast majority of the job 
categories in the ABA’s Employment Summary Report, NALP has generated, 
on a year-by-year basis, a “median” salary.53 For each year in question, NALP’s 
median salaries were imputed to everyone identifi ed as having a full-time, long-
term job in each of the job categories for which a median salary was available. 
50. The percentage of graduates in full-time, long-term bar passage required or J.D. advantage 
positions increased from 65.2% to 70.2% (exclusive of law school-funded positions) between 
2013 and 2015. This increase in the percentage employed in full-time, long-term positions, 
however, masked a decrease in the number of graduates in full-time, long-term bar passage-
required or J.D. advantage positions (exclusive of law school-funded positions), which fell 
between 2013 and 2015 from 30,491 to 28,087 (-7.9%). Compare ABA Employment Summary Report 
for 2014 (Class of 2013), with ABA Employment Summary Report for 2016 (Class of 2015), supra note 
48 with additional calculations (spreadsheets on fi le with author). The overall percentage 
employed increased in spite of this decline in full-time, long-term bar passage-required or 
J.D. advantage positions because of an even larger percentage decrease in the number of 
graduates, which fell from 46,774 in 2013 to 39,984 in 2015 (-14.5%). See ABA REQUIRED 
DISCLOSURES, supra note 5.
51. The number of graduates in the “employment unknown” category dropped by 30.4% 
between 2013 and 2015 (977 to 680), while the number of graduates in the “unemployed 
seeking” category dropped by 25.1% (4,990 to 3,736). Compare ABA Employment Summary Report 
for 2014 (Class of 2013), with ABA Employment Summary Report for 2016 (Class of 2015), with 
additional calculations (spreadsheets on fi le with author).
52. See ABA Employment Summary Reports, supra note 48.
53. See, e.g., Overview of Employment by Sector, in NALP, JOBS & JDS: EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIES OF 
NEW LAW GRADUATES, CLASS OF 2015, at 32 (2016).
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No median salary was available for two full-time, long-term job categories—
solo and unknown. For the solo category, the imputed salary used was 
$37,500.54 For the “unknown” full-time, long-term employment category, the 
imputed salary used was $40,000.55 
There also were no median salaries available for any part-time or short-term 
positions. All those categorized as short-term or part-time were assigned an 
imputed income of $25,000.56 Nor were median salaries available for any of 
the three “bad news” outcomes or for those listed as unemployed start date 
deferred or as employed pursuing graduate degree. All graduates in any of 
these fi ve categories were assigned an imputed income of $20,000.57
54. I chose to use $37,500 as the salary for those in the solo category, as this is between 80% and 
85% of the lowest reported salary category for the Class of 2013, the public interest category, 
with a median salary of $45,000. While some may view this as a generous assumption 
regarding the median income of those in solo practice, this is less about the “actual” estimate 
than it is about the comparative weighted-average net income across categories. To the 
extent that this is perceived to be a generous assumption, using a lower salary number would 
reduce more signifi cantly the weighted-average income of those law schools in the lower 
LSAT categories. These law schools have a higher percentage of graduates in solo practice 
(roughly fi ve percent among law schools with median LSATs less than 150, while only one 
percent to two percent among law schools with median LSATs of 160–164). 
55. I chose to use $40,000 as the salary for those in the “unknown full-time, long-term” category, 
as this category probably represents a blend of positions across multiple categories that 
may refl ect a slightly higher median income than for solo practitioners. Given uncertainty 
regarding possible salaries, however, I wanted the amount to remain at a level less than 
the lowest reported category, the public interest category, with a median salary of $45,000. 
While some may view this as a generous assumption regarding the median income of those 
whose employment category is unknown, this is less about the “actual” estimate than it is 
about the comparative weighted-average net income across categories.
56. The ABA Employment Outcomes Questionnaire Defi nitions and Instructions defi nes 
part-time positions as positions of less than thirty-fi ve hours per week. See 2015 Employment 
Questionnaire (for 2014 Graduates): Defi nitions & Instructions 2, AM BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL 
EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/4ZH9-57U8]. If one assumes the “median” part-time position is twenty-
fi ve hours per week and that the average pay is $20 per hour, on a fi fty-week year this translates 
to a salary of $25,000. The ABA Employment Outcomes Questionnaire Defi nitions and 
Instructions defi nes short-term positions as positions with a “defi nite term of less than a 
year.” Id. at 1. These positions might be full-time positions for which higher salaries might 
be anticipated. Thus, it seemed reasonable to assume a median salary of $25,000 for those in 
short-term or part-time positions. 
57. I chose to use $20,000 as the salary for those in these fi ve categories, as I think it is unrealistic 
to assume that people in these categories would have no income at all. They would need 
something to live on and may well have a job that provides at least minimum wage to do what 
they can to make ends meet, even if they choose not to report this employment (perhaps 
because it is not professional employment or because the position was obtained after the 
deadline for reporting employment outcomes). Those with start date deferred particularly 
are expected to have a not insignifi cant income once their positions start. Those pursuing 
graduate degrees also may have a stipend or other income. While some may view this as a 
generous assumption regarding the median income of those in these fi ve categories, this 
is less about the “actual” estimate than it is about the comparative weighted-average net 
income across categories. To the extent that it is a generous assumption, using a lower salary 
number would reduce more signifi cantly the weighted-average income of those law schools 
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Once all graduates had been assigned an imputed income, then all incomes 
for all graduates for all law schools in a given LSAT category were summed 
and divided by the total number of graduates from all law schools in a given 
LSAT category to create the weighted-average imputed income for each LSAT 
category.
Figure 7 reports the weighted-average imputed incomes for the 2013 
graduating class and the 2015 graduating class.58
Figure 7—Average Imputed Income for Graduating Classes
in 2013 and 2015 across Categories of Law Schools
Based on Median LSATs for 2010 and 2012
(in 2015 dollars)
Figure 7 highlights that weighted-average imputed income declines 
signifi cantly in correspondence with declines in the median LSAT category 
for law schools. For the class that entered in 2010 and graduated in 2013, 
graduates of law schools with a median LSAT of 165 or higher had a weighted-
average imputed income in 2015 dollars of roughly $92,600, while graduates 
of law schools with a median LSAT of less than 150 had a signifi cantly lower 
weighted-average imputed income of less than $40,000. As one goes “down” 
the categories of law schools by median LSAT, one fi nds a direct relationship 
between declines in median LSAT category and declines in weighted-average 
imputed incomes. Law schools with a median LSAT of 160–164 had a weighted-
average imputed income in 2013 (in 2015 dollars) of roughly $57,700, while 
law schools with a median LSAT of 155–159 had a weighted-average imputed 
income of roughly $51,100, and law schools with a median LSAT of 150–154 
had a weighted-average imputed income of roughly $46,400.
in the lower LSAT categories that have a higher percentage of graduates in three of these 
categories (see Figure 5, supra).
58. Note that the numbers in Figure 7 are adjusted to account for infl ation and reported in 
2015 dollars. In adjusting for infl ation, I used the U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, supra note 
26 (indicating infl ation for the period between 2013 and 2015 was a modest 1.7%). The 
spreadsheets with the “imputed income” calculations for Figure 7 are on fi le with the author.
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For the class that entered in 2012 and graduated in 2015, this relationship 
across categories remained consistent, but all fi ve categories of law school saw 
increases in weighted-average imputed income, again refl ecting a modestly 
improved employment market for 2015 graduates in comparison with graduates 
in 2013.
IV.  Reflections on Comparison of Average Net Tuition by LSAT Category 
and Outcome Measures by LSAT Category of Law Schools
A.  Assessing Short-Term Return on Investment for Students in Different LSAT Categories
Given the variability in net tuition, bar passage results, and employment 
outcomes (including weighted-average imputed income), for whom might law 
school be a particularly good short-term investment?
Those with LSAT scores of 165 or higher, on average, are paying more than 
most others for their legal education (roughly $32,800 in 2014), but for that 
investment they have the benefi t of having the highest bar passage rates and 
the most robust employment outcomes (including weighted-average imputed 
income). They also have the prospect of paying less for law school at a lower-
ranked law school that off ers a scholarship if they wish to pursue that option.
Those in the next two LSAT categories—160–164 and 155–159—are paying 
the lowest average net tuition for their legal education—roughly $23,000 for 
those in the 160-164 category and roughly $23,600 for those in the 155–159 
category in 2014—and still have fairly high bar passage rates and reasonably 
good employment outcomes, although with a noted drop in weighted-average 
imputed income in comparison with those in the 165-or-higher LSAT category.
Those in the fourth LSAT category—150–154—are paying a little bit more in 
terms of average net tuition for their legal education—roughly $26,300 in 2014—
and see modestly less robust bar passage rates and employment outcomes than 
those in the two categories just discussed.
Finally, those in the lower end of the LSAT distribution—145–149 and less 
than 145—have higher average net tuition profi les than everyone other than those 
in the highest LSAT category (roughly $30,100 (145–149) and roughly $32,900 
(less than 145) in 2014). Nonetheless, despite paying more than students in 
most other categories (and substantially more in some cases), students in these 
two categories have the worst bar passage rates and employment outcomes 
(including weighted-average imputed income). 
Even though students with LSATs of less than 145 have an average net tuition 
that is more than those in the 165-or-higher LSAT category, the graduates of 
law schools these students attend (law schools with median LSATs of less 
than 150) had far worse outcomes. They saw bar passage rates of roughly 60% 
(compared with roughly 90%), had “bad news” employment outcomes in the 
25%–30% range (compared with roughly 3%–5%), and had weighted-average 
imputed incomes of less than $45,000 (compared with more than $90,000). 
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The short-term return on investment for these students is far less promising 
than it is for students at the high end of the LSAT distribution.59 
B.  Assessing Differential Impact on Women and Students of Color
What does this mean for women and students of color, in particular? 
Aaron Taylor, and Deborah Merritt and Kyle McEntee, respectively, have 
written about the fact that students of color and women make up much 
larger percentages of students in law schools with lower median LSATs.60 
The average net tuition trends across LSAT categories data would suggest 
that women and students of color are being disproportionately aff ected by 
the net tuition pricing diff erentials refl ected in these data. Similarly, the bar 
passage data and employment outcomes data would suggest that women and 
students of color, who graduate in larger numbers from law schools with lower 
median LSATs, also are likely experiencing less robust bar passage rates and 
employment outcomes.61
59. Notably, in their analysis of lifetime earnings premiums for those with a J.D. degree, Michael 
Simkovic and his co-author Frank McIntyre fail to address the extent to which their data are 
applicable to the situation of prospective law students with LSATs less than 145 or graduates 
of law schools with median LSATs of less than 150. Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The 
Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (2014). Indeed, Figure 2 in their article, 
which shows the lifetime earnings trajectory by age category, shows a beginning salary (for 
those in the twenty-six-to-thirty age range) of roughly $90,000 (in 2013 dollars). Id. at 273. 
While some earnings premium may still be associated with the J.D. degree for some of those 
graduating from law schools with a median LSAT of less than 150, for the roughly 14% who 
experience attrition, see supra note 38, and for the roughly 40% or more who fail the bar exam, 
the earnings premiums, if any, are likely much more elusive.
60. See Aaron N. Taylor, Questioning the Status Quo on Law School Diversity, ST. LOUIS AM. (July 
22, 2015), http://www.stlamerican.com/diversity/questioning-the-status-quo-on-law-
school-diversity/article_bd352118-2fbd-11e5-8c7d-3fac64061f12.html [https://perma.
cc/86ET-9VST]; Deborah Jones Merritt & Kyle McEntee, The Gender Bias in Law School 
Admissions, BLOOMBERG LAW: BIG LAW BUS. (Nov. 30, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/the-gender-
bias-in-law-school-admissions/ [https://perma.cc/3WJ8-NEVZ]. My own analysis of the 
ABA data on enrollment and ethnicity indicates that for the fi rst-year class that began in 
fall 2015, over 40% of fi rst-years at alphabetically ranked law schools were students of color; 
among law schools ranked in the top 100, however, only roughly 27% of fi rst-year students 
were students of color. Spreadsheet on fi le with author.
61. The longer-term return for women in particular also is somewhat discouraging, as recent 
data analysis suggests that women lawyers see signifi cant gaps in wages in comparison with 
male lawyers as they move through their careers. See COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE LAW 6-7 (Jan. 2017), https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current_glance_statistics_
january2017.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C9H-UGMC] (showing weekly 
earnings for women attorneys that were roughly 76% of earnings for men lawyers (average 
for 2005-2009) but increased to roughly 84% (average for 2011-1015) based on statistics from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics); Table 8.3. Median Income by Setting and Gender (AJD2), in RONIT 
DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD II: SECOND RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL 
CAREERS 67 (2009) (showing that seven years after graduation, women attorneys in almost 
all settings were earning less than men attorneys, generally between 10% less and 20% less 
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C.  Insights for Prelaw Advisors and Prospective Law Students
One value of this research for prelaw advisors and prospective law students 
is that it allows them to assess the range of law school options that might be 
available to them with some idea of the “net tuition price point” they can 
expect at diff erent law schools. Appendix Tables 2 through 7 provide the 
detailed breakdown of net tuition trends between 2010 and 2014 for each 
LSAT category.
For example, a student with an LSAT score in the 160–164 category can look 
at Appendix Table 3 to learn that in 2014, there were law school options in 
all net tuition categories with diff erent corresponding rankings. The student 
could have gone to a law school with an average rank of 80 and expected net 
tuition of less than $10,000. The student could have gone to a law school with 
an average rank of 57 and expected net tuition of $10,000–$30,000 per year. 
The student could have gone to a law school with an average rank of 38 and 
expected net tuition to be $30,000–$40,000. If the student wanted a top-20 
law school experience, that also was at least a possibility, assuming the student 
was willing to pay $40,000 or $50,000 or more for the opportunity.
Looking at a diff erent example, a student with an LSAT score in the 150–154 
category can look at Appendix Table 5 to learn that in 2014, roughly 80% of 
such similarly situated students ended up with net tuition of $10,000–$40,000, 
with 27% in the $10,000-$20,000 category, 31% in the $20,000–30,000 category, 
and 21% in the $30,000–$40,000 category. For the student with an LSAT score 
in the 150–154 range, the average ranking of law school was not profoundly 
diff erent at these three price points—an average ranking of 108 for the $10,000–
$20,000 category, of 125 for the $20,000–$30,000 category, and of 119 for the 
$30,000–$40,000 category. Some of the limited diff erence in average law 
school ranking across net tuition categories for students in the 150–154 category 
might be attributable to geographic preferences and the fact that within some 
regions, students with an LSAT score of between 150 and 154 may not have had 
lower cost options available to them without leaving the region.
For students in the lowest LSAT category, less than 145, Appendix Table 7 
highlights that the options were much more limited. In 2014, one-third of these 
students were paying net tuition of $40,000 or more for their legal education, 
while another one-third were paying net tuition of $30,000–$40,000. On 
average, however, the range of schools these students were attending had 
an average ranking in the 160–170 range. Unlike students in the other LSAT 
categories, the students in the less-than-145 category did not have an option of 
going to a lower-ranked law school at a lower net tuition or a higher-ranked 
law school at a higher net tuition. They just had to absorb relatively high net 
tuition to go to lower-ranked law schools.
depending upon the setting); but see Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 59, at 282 (Table 7 
and accompanying text, noting that the lifetime earnings premium is greater for men at the 
high end of the distribution but greater for women at the lower and middle portions of the 
distribution).
Net Tuition Trends by LSAT Category
74 Journal of Legal Education
One interesting point is that students may use diff erent calculus depending 
upon the LSAT category in which they fi nd themselves. Appendix Table 2 
shows that between 2010 and 2014, the percentage of students in the 165-or-
higher category who had net tuition of less than $20,000 dropped from 
roughly 26% to roughly 16%, while the percentage with net tuition of more 
than $40,000 increased from 21% to 36%. These students had options to go to 
well-regarded, top-50 law schools with net tuition of less than $10,000 or less 
than $20,000, but on average chose to pay more than $40,000 or $50,000 to 
go to highly ranked law schools.62 By contrast, Appendix Table 5 shows that 
between 2010 and 2014, the percentage of students in the 150–154 category who 
had net tuition of less than $20,000 increased from roughly 24% to roughly 
34%, while the percentage paying more than $40,000 remained relatively fl at 
(increasing from 12% to 13%), even with the prospect of getting into much more 
highly ranked law schools at the higher net tuition rate. This may refl ect an 
appreciation that the diff erence between top-20 and top-50 law school is more 
meaningful to those in the 165-or-higher LSAT category than the diff erence 
between a law school ranked in the 50-80 range compared with a law school 
ranked in the 100–120 range for those in the 150–154 LSAT category. This 
also may result from students in the 150–154 category not fully appreciating 
opportunities they might have to get admitted to law schools ranked more 
highly given the changes in the applicant pool.
D.  Bigger Questions for Law Schools
Beginning over a decade ago, commentators on legal education have been 
highlighting the reality of the “cross-subsidy” within legal education.63 The 
theory is that the profound focus on rankings and entering class credentials 
means that law schools are discounting tuition to those applicants with high 
credentials by providing signifi cant scholarships to these students. Their cost 
of attending law school is eff ectively subsidized by those students with lower 
credentials who are not getting scholarships and are paying full tuition.
Although this study is focused more on what is happening across law 
schools than at specifi c law schools, the dynamic net tuition model I developed 
was premised on this “cross-subsidy” concept as scholarships were awarded to 
those with the highest LSATs scores in descending order within any given law 
62. See supra discussion at note 35 and accompanying text.
63. See Daniel J. Morrissey, Saving Legal Education, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 254, 269 (2006) (noting 
for the fi rst time the cross-subsidy of having some students with weak credentials paying 
full tuition while other students with strong credentials receiving full-tuition or other 
scholarships); Jerome Organ, How Scholarship Programs Impact Students and the Culture of Law 
School, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 173, 186 n.22 (2011); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 
96–103 (2012); Derek T. Muller, Solving Law School Admissions; Or, How U.S. News Distorts Student 




school. The recent analysis from LSSSE confi rms that this pattern of awarding 
scholarships is pretty well-entrenched within legal education.64
This fi nancial model can work for law schools provided enough people are 
willing to pay full tuition (or nearly full tuition) to attend law school. But 
the percentage of students paying full tuition has been declining,65 raising 
questions about the continued viability of this fi nancial model in the years 
ahead, particularly if the federal government curtails the ready availability of 
federal loans for graduate students.
64. LSSSE REPORT 2016, supra note 3.
65. See supra Table 1 and text accompanying notes 33–40; Muller, Percentage of Scholarships Climbing, 
supra note 16.
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Appendix
Description of the Dynamic Model for Estimating Net Tuition
1.  LSAT Distribution on a School-by-School Basis
The fi rst step in the process of developing the dynamic net tuition model 
I generated involved estimating the fi rst-year enrollment by LSAT category 
at each law school. This process is fairly straightforward. It begins with 
the number of entering fi rst-year students from each law school’s Standard 
509 Information Report for each year.66 Then, using the LSAT profi le 
(75th/50th/25th) for each school for the year involved I allocated students into 
six LSAT categories—165 or higher, 160–164, 155–159, 150–154, 145–149, and less 
than 145—trying to be as consistent as possible among law schools with similar 
profi les. To make sure the distribution was relatively realistic, I cross-checked 
the number in each LSAT category across the pool of law schools in the model 
with the numbers in each category from the LSAC’s National Decision Profi le 
for the year in question. I kept making adjustments in the distribution until 
the numbers within each LSAT category were within 10 of the proportional 
number based on the National Decision Profi le for that LSAT category for 
that year (generally within one-tenth of one percent).
2.  Scholarship Distribution for First-Years
The second step in this process involved estimating the scholarship 
distribution for fi rst-years in three scholarship categories—full, half to full, and 
less than half.67 As noted in the text, however, this is complicated by the fact that 
law schools report grants and scholarships in their Standard 509 Information 
Reports for the entire student body, not for fi rst-years. In addition, they report 
grants and scholarships on a one-year delayed basis (so the 2015 Standard 509 
Report is reporting on the 2014–2015 scholarships at a given law school, rather 
than the 2015–2016 scholarships). This meant I needed to develop a dynamic, 
multiyear model for each individual law school that “worked” over several years 
given each law school’s reported information—taking into account enrollment, 
attrition, transfers, grants and scholarships, conditional scholarships, and 
part-time students, and then using that information to estimate the number of 
fi rst-year scholarships in each scholarship category for each year. 
This model started with the entering class in 2008–2009, and then the 
subsequent class in 2009–2010, as a way of estimating scholarships in the third-
year class and second-year class in fall 2010, so that those scholarships could 
be subtracted from the total to estimate the fi rst-year scholarships in each of 
the three scholarship categories in 2010–2011. As noted above, in estimating 
scholarships for the second-year and third-year classes in 2010–2011, I also 
66. See Standard 509 Information Reports, ABA REQUIRED DISCLOSURES, supra note 5.
67. The Standard 509 Reports also include a “more than full” scholarship category. For purposes 
of this analysis, I included all numbers associated with “more than full” scholarships in the 
“full scholarship” category.
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had to account for academic attrition, transfer attrition, and conditional 
scholarships that might have been eliminated or reduced in amount. Then 
I did the same thing for 2011–2012, with the entering class in 2009–2010 now 
representing the third-year class and the entering class in 2010–2011 now 
representing the second-year class. This then continued through the entering 
class for the 2014–2015 academic year.
In doing this dynamic modeling, a few “checks” on the modeling process 
seem to support the reasonable accuracy of the model. First, the number of 
scholarships for fi rst-years in any of the three scholarship categories in a given 
year could not be negative. If the model generated a negative number, I had 
to go upstream to one or more of the earlier years to make an adjustment that 
reduced the number of scholarships carried into the second and/or third year 
such that the number of scholarships for fi rst-years in any given scholarship 
category in the succeeding year(s) was at least zero.
Second, the number of scholarships could not exceed the number of fi rst-
year students in any given year. If the model generated more scholarships than 
fi rst-year students in a given year, I had to go upstream to one or more of the 
earlier years to make an adjustment that increased the number of scholarships 
carried into the second and/or third year such that the total number of 
scholarships across all three scholarship categories for fi rst-years did not 
exceed the number of fi rst-year students in the succeeding year(s).
Third, for those law schools with conditional scholarships, starting in 2011–
2012 (when law schools were required to report the number of conditional 
scholarships given to fi rst-year students), the number of fi rst-year scholarships 
had to match or exceed the number of conditional scholarships in a given year. 
If fewer fi rst-year scholarships were granted than conditional scholarships 
reported for fi rst-year students, then I had to go upstream to one or more of the 
earlier years to make an adjustment that decreased the number of scholarships 
carried into the second and/or third year so that the number of scholarships 
for fi rst-years at least matched the number of conditional scholarships reported 
for that year.
Notably, this was an iterative process. One could solve the problem in 2011–
2012 by making adjustments in 2009–2010 or 2010–2011, only to discover that 
something didn’t work right in 2012–2013 or 2013–2014 or 2014–2015—that one 
(or more) of these three principles was violated in a subsequent year. This 
would require further refi nement of the model until the numbers “worked” for 
every year from 2010–2011 through 2014–2015.
In making these adjustments, I had to make reasonable assumptions based 
on the data available regarding the given law school’s student population in 
the years in question. I have a separate spreadsheet detailing the reasonable 
assumptions I made in constructing the dynamic net tuition model so that it 
“worked” for all schools for all years from 2010–2011 through 2014–2015.68
68. The spreadsheet with the identifi cation of the reasonable assumptions in the net tuition 
model is on fi le with the author.
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3.  Allocating Scholarships
After generating the LSAT distribution for each law school and the 
scholarship distribution model for each law school, I then allocated 
scholarships assuming they were awarded based on LSAT scores, with the 
largest scholarships awarded to the students with the highest LSATs and 
working down from the top. I recognize that this assumption is imperfect. 
I recognize that some schools provide scholarships based on GPA as well as 
LSAT, or on diversity or leadership, but I think most people will agree that this 
assumption for scholarship distribution makes sense, because the emphasis 
on entering class profi les for U.S. News rankings demonstrates a signifi cant 
“investment” in students with LSATs above a law school’s median LSAT.69
In doing the net tuition calculations, I started by assuming all students 
were full-time students paying resident tuition. I did this because there is 
no publicly available information from which to determine the number of 
nonresident students at public university law schools. Similarly, there is no 
way of knowing where those nonresident students would be in the LSAT 
distribution at the law school. This assumption has the eff ect of understating 
the base tuition for some subset of nonresident students at public university 
law schools, but given that the focus here is on looking at trends over time, 
applying this approach consistently should not aff ect the comparative analysis 
across LSAT categories over time.
In subtracting scholarships from base tuition, I assumed half- to full-tuition 
scholarships were “one-half” and that less than half-tuition scholarships were 
“one-quarter.” This arguably understates scholarship values, counterbalancing 
to some extent the understating of tuition for nonresidents at public university 
law schools. But again, given that the focus was on looking at trends over 
time, applying this approach consistently should not aff ect the comparative 
analysis across LSAT categories over time.
As noted above, I started with full scholarships applied to those with 
the highest LSATs. When full scholarships were exhausted I moved to half 
scholarships. When half scholarships were exhausted, I moved to one-quarter 
scholarships. When those were exhausted I assumed all remaining students 
paid full tuition.
For each LSAT category in each year, I then calculated an average net 
tuition by adding the total net tuition paid by all students in a given LSAT 
category and dividing by the number of students in that LSAT category.  I then 
adjusted for infl ation so that all average net tuition numbers are reported in 
2014 dollars. (Note that the initial allocations of students into cost categories 
in Appendix Tables 2-7 were based on the net tuition number for that year 
without adjusting for infl ation.)
69. The LSSSE REPORT 2016, supra note 3, affi  rms that this assumption is reasonable, as it 
documents that most scholarships at a given law school go to students with higher LSAT 
scores. See also Muller, Solving Law School Admissions, supra note 63. 
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This process resulted in the average net tuition for each LSAT category 
for the years 2010 through 2014 as set forth in Appendix Table 1. In addition, 
for each year in question I identifi ed the U.S. News rank for each law school. 
Then, for each net tuition category associated with each LSAT category (for 
each “box”) we multiplied the number of students at a given law school by the 
given law school’s U.S. News rank, summed the products, and then divided 
the total by the number of students in that “box” to get the average rank of law 
school for the students in that “box” as shown in Appendix Table 1. Appendix 
Table 1 contains the underlying data that support Figures 1, 2, and 3 in the text.
Appendix Table 1—Data Supporting Figure 1 and Figure 2
Average Net Tuition and Average Law School Rank for LSAT Category 
2010–2014 (in 2014 dollars)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
% Change 
2010–2014
165+ Avg. Net 
Tuition




25 25 24 19 15
160-164 Avg. Net 
Tuition




71 65 62 58 52
155-159 Avg. Net 
Tuition




105 100 98 88 83
150-154 Avg. Net 
Tuition




136 134 122 119 115
145-149 Avg. Net 
Tuition





152 152 147 143 142
<145 Avg. Net 
Tuition




170 167 165 164 164
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The remaining tables, Appendix Tables 2 through 7, contain the distribution 
of students across net tuition categories and average rank of law school for 
each net tuition category for each LSAT category for the years 2010–2014.
Appendix Table 2—Net Tuition Trends and Average Rank of Law School 
for 2010–2014 for Students in LSAT Category 165 or Higher
(in 2014 dollars)


















2010 # 1416 1057 2106 3051 1733 299 9662 25 30,044
% 14.7% 10.9% 21.8% 31.6% 17.9% 3.1% 100%
Avg. Rank 49 46 28 15 11 5
2011 # 1251 1255 1782 2862 1000 1020 9170 25 30,474
% 13.6% 13.7% 19.4% 31.2% 10.9% 11.1% 100%
Avg. Rank 55 41 26 17 9 7
2012 # 1044 761 1820 2359 720 1112 7816 24 30,824
% 13.4% 9.7% 23.3% 30.2% 9.2% 14.2% 100%
Avg. Rank 56 48 25 14 9 5
2013 # 861 511 1650 1336 1042 920 6320 19 30,929
% 13.6% 8.1% 26.1% 21.1% 16.5% 14.6% 100%
Avg. Rank 42 36 22 15 7 5
2014 # 679 267 1858 923 1027 1036 5790 15 32,773
% 11.7% 4.6% 32.1% 15.9% 17.7% 17.9% 100%
Avg. Rank 32 27 18 16 7 5
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Appendix Table 3—Net Tuition Trends and Average Rank of Law School 
for 2010–2014 for Students in LSAT Category 160–164 (in 2014 dollars)


















2010 # 1518 3445 2973 1632 1257 51 10,876 71 24,272
% 14.0% 31.7% 27.3% 15.0% 11.6% 0.5% 100%
Avg. Rank 138 81 74 61 30 7
2011 # 950 2820 2058 1891 967 205 8891 65 25,557
% 10.7% 31.7% 23.1% 21.3% 10.9% 2.3% 100%
Avg. Rank 112 69 69 57 28 11
2012 # 1017 1959 2058 1688 573 228 7523 62 24,639
% 13.5% 26.0% 27.4% 22.4% 7.6% 3.0% 100%
Avg. Rank 99 71 63 47 20 11
2013 # 1120 1458 1829 1502 236 476 6621 58 23,802
% 16.9% 22.0% 27.6% 22.7% 3.6% 7.2% 100%
Avg. Rank 96 63 61 41 14 14
2014 # 1189 1302 1674 1170 197 503 6035 52 23,004
% 19.7% 21.6% 27.7% 19.4% 3.3% 8.3% 100%
Avg. Rank 80 57 57 38 16 8
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Appendix Table 4—Net Tuition Trends and Average Rank of Law School 
for 2010–2014 for Students in LSAT Category 155–159 (in 2014 dollars)

















2010 # 855 3710 3426 2473 1335 10 11,809 105 26,977
% 7.2% 31.4% 29.0% 20.9% 11.3% 0.1% 100%
Avg. Rank 161 128 128 114 63 13
2011 # 810 3301 2820 2411 1539 44 10,925 100 27,055
% 7.4% 30.2% 25.8% 22.1% 14.1% 0.4% 100%
Avg. Rank 147 107 104 97 63 11
2012 # 902 2579 3073 2401 879 186 10,020 98 25,981
% 9.0% 25.7% 30.7% 24.0% 8.8% 1.9% 100%
Avg. Rank 136 107 108 84 44 46
2013 # 784 2733 2278 1856 768 273 8692 88 24,967
% 9.0% 31.4% 26.2% 21.4% 8.8% 3.1% 100%
Avg. Rank 130 94 98 76 48 28
2014 # 1156 2438 1973 1706 531 374 8178 83 23,656
% 14.1% 29.8% 24.1% 20.9% 6.5% 4.6% 100%
Avg. Rank 120 87 91 65 56 20
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Appendix Table 5—Net Tuition Trends and Average Rank of Law School 
for 2010–2014 for Students in LSAT Category 150–154 (in 2014 dollars)

















2010 # 278 2284 3676 3328 1278 0 10,844 136 30,219
% 2.6% 21.1% 33.9% 30.7% 11.8% 0.0% 100%
Avg. Rank 170 145 153 152 119
2011 # 327 2052 3386 2496 1874 0 10,135 134 30,153
% 3.2% 20.2% 33.4% 24.6% 18.5% 0.0% 100%
Avg. Rank 164 135 143 133 112
2012 # 190 1954 2723 2619 1164 74 8724 122 29,466
% 2.2% 22.4% 31.2% 30.0% 13.3% 0.8% 100%
Avg. Rank 149 131 130 124 84 61
2013 # 236 1806 3045 2186 1045 68 8386 119 27,954
% 2.8% 21.5% 36.3% 26.1% 12.5% 0.8% 100%
Avg. Rank 163 114 129 123 82 64
2014 # 491 2251 2627 1729 925 176 8199 115 26,298
% 6.0% 27.5% 32.0% 21.1% 11.3% 2.1% 100%
Avg. Rank 150 108 125 119 87 55
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Appendix Table 6—Net Tuition Trends and Average Rank of Law School 
for 2010–2014 for Students in LSAT Category 145–149 (in 2014 dollars)

















2010 # 294 732 1433 2305 472 0 5236 152 30,945
% 5.6% 14.0% 27.4% 44.0% 9.0% 0.0% 100%
Avg. Rank 170 158 165 165 143
2011 # 97 793 1337 2275 820 0 5322 152 32,405
% 1.8% 14.9% 25.1% 42.7% 15.4% 0.0% 100%
Avg. Rank 164 145 157 158 135
2012 # 131 793 1629 1929 1033 0 5515 147 31,645
% 2.4% 14.4% 29.5% 35.0% 18.7% 0.0% 100%
Avg. Rank 168 143 150 152 134
2013 # 114 751 1597 2225 985 17 5689 143 31,029
% 2.0% 13.2% 28.1% 39.1% 17.3% 0.3% 100%
Avg. Rank 170 132 145 154 122 58
2014 # 206 871 1572 1977 835 89 5550 142 30,091
% 3.7% 15.7% 28.3% 35.6% 15.0% 1.6% 100%
Avg. Rank 170 128 144 152 131 82
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Appendix Table 7—Net Tuition Trends and Average Rank of Law School 
for 2010–2014 for Students in LSAT Category Less than 145
(in 2014 dollars)

















2010 # 239 216 162 1259 27 0 1903 170 29,420
% 12.6% 11.4% 8.5% 66.2% 1.4% 0.0% 100%
Avg. Rank 170 170 170 170 170
2011 # 14 296 195 1279 161 0 1945 167 33,191
% 0.7% 15.2% 10.0% 65.8% 8.3% 0.0% 100%
Avg. Rank 158 167 165 168 161
2012 # 34 466 173 1564 418 0 2655 165 33,877
% 1.3% 17.6% 6.5% 58.9% 15.7% 0.0% 100%
Avg. Rank 170 166 158 168 158
2013 # 0 515 256 1002 1230 0 3003 164 34,046
% 0.0% 17.1% 8.5% 33.4% 41.0% 0.0% 100%
Avg. Rank 164 156 165 165
2014 # 55 516 424 1165 1057 28 3245 164 32,912
% 1.7% 15.9% 13.1% 35.9% 32.6% 0.9% 100%
Avg. Rank 170 161 159 166 166 135
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